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The Parmenides poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the 
criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an 
ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer 
express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life, 
but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to 
explain nature as a whole. Plato’s conception of dialectic, it is further suggested, 
consequently changes into a value-neutral method directed at tracing the 
interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain 
passages on method from the Sophist and the Statesman as well.  
The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the 
question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages 
on method from the Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative 
ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues 
encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth 
and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this 
attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a 
significant difference, between Plato’s Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers. 
Introduction 
1 In the first part of Plato’s Parmenides, Parmenides in rapid succession presents six 
problems facing the young Socrates’ assumption that there are forms. This article 
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undertakes to interpret in detail the first problem as presented by Parmenides in 
order to address the question how considerations of worth and honor influence 
philosophical inquiry, a question that has direct bearing on the way we should 
conceive of Plato’s ontology. 
2 The six problems presented by Parmenides are thematically linked by the fact that 
they all point to certain difficulties pertaining to the assumption that there are 
forms that Socrates advances at the beginning of the dialogue (128e6-130a2). 
Nevertheless, the first problem, presented at 130a8-130e4, stands out from the 
rest in respect of two features: i) it is not primarily preoccupied with the question 
whether or not forms can be separate from the things that participate in them, but 
rather with the question for what things, according to Socrates, there are forms; 
ii) in the discussion of this problem only does Parmenides emphasize Socrates’ 
youth and in general his philosophical immaturity.  
3 These two features have led several commentators to assume that the passage 
discussing the problem documents a radical change in Plato’s ontological 
outlook.1 This assumption is closely connected to the view that Plato’s earlier, 
more Socratic interest had been directed primarily at political and ethical issues, 
while his later interest came to be directed at nature as a whole, and that this 
reorientation led him to a novel understanding of forms according to which they 
no longer expressed moral or political values but came to resemble concepts. This 
change, it has also been supposed,2 is further documented in some passages 
discussing philosophical method found in the Sophist and the Statesman. For this 
reason, these passages, together with the passage on the scope of the assumption 
that there are forms from the Parmenides, have been central to modern attempts 
at tracing the supposed development of Plato’s philosophy.  
4 The overall aim of this article is to demonstrate that the passages in question, from 
these three dialogues commonly supposed to be later than the Republic, do not 
support such a view of Plato’s development. Instead, it will be argued, they point 
to a feature of an ideal of philosophical inquiry advanced in several of Plato’s 
dialogues, namely the idea that the quality of something cannot be determined in 
isolation from the question what that something is. The passages should, 
accordingly, be regarded as important for understanding this key feature of Plato’s 
ideal of philosophical inquiry, and not as providing support for the supposed 
change in ontological outlook sketched above. 
5 More specifically, the article aims at defending two interconnected claims. First, 
the passage in the Parmenides discussing for what things, according to Socrates, 
there are forms, shows that Plato regarded common opinions concerning the 
relative worth and honor of things as irrelevant for philosophical inquiries into 
the essence of things. Second, the passage further suggests, when read in 
                                                             
1 For details, see section I below. 
2 For details, see section II below. 
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connection with the Sophist and the Statesman, that Plato regarded the attitude 
toward philosophical inquiry argued for in the Parmenides as Eleatic in origin, 
but also that Plato saw this attitude as congruent with, rather than as opposed to, 
a Socratic attitude. The defense of these two claims proceeds as follows.  
6  In part I of the article, the passage from the Parmenides (130a8-130e4) 
concerning the question for what things there are forms is interpreted in detail. 
The interpretation starts out from a criticism of the developmental reading of the 
passage sketched above. A careful consideration of the entities considered in the 
passage and the question they raise about ontology demonstrates, it is argued, that 
the developmental reading is untenable. It is further argued that the passage, while 
revolving around the question: ‘for what things are there forms?’, leaves this 
question open. The question the passage seeks to settle is rather: ‘what role should 
ordinary estimations of worth and honor be accorded in the attempt to settle the 
question for what things there are forms?’ The text indicates that the answer to 
this latter question is that such estimations should not be accorded any role. 
7  In part II of the article it is shown that an attitude similar to that advocated 
by Parmenides in the passage analyzed in part I is found in two passages 
concerning method from the Sophist and the Statesman (Soph. 227a10-b6, Polit. 
266d7-10). It is argued that these passages neither advocate an un-Socratic 
ontology nor an un-Socratic ideal of inquiry, as critics defending the 
developmental approach to the Parmenides criticized in part I commonly assume. 
Instead, it is argued, these passages are in conformity with a basic approach to 
questions concerning worth and honor characteristic of Plato’s Socrates, namely 
to insist that such questions can be settled only on the basis of an inquiry into the 
essence or nature of the thing in question.    
Part I: Ontology and common opinions 
concerning worth and honor in the 
Parmenides  
8 Parmenides presents the first problem he raises concerning the young Socrates’ 
assumption that there are forms as follows: 
Socrates, he said, your impulse toward speeches and argument is 
admirable. Now tell me: do you yourself thus distinguish, as you say, 
certain forms in themselves separately by themselves, and separately 
again the things that have a share of them? And do you think that 
likeness itself is something separate from the likeness that we have, 
and again one and many and all the others you just heard Zeno 
mention? 
Yes I do, said Socrates. 
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And of this sort too? said Parmenides. For example, a certain form of 
just, alone by itself, and of beautiful and good and again all such as 
these? 
Yes, he said. 
Well, is there a form of man separate from us and all such as we are, 
a certain form of man by itself, or of fire or water too? 
I have often been in perplexity, Parmenides, he said, about whether 
one should speak about them as about the others, or not. 
And what about these, Socrates – they could really seem ridiculous: 
hair and mud and dirt, for example, or anything else that is utterly 
worthless and trivial. Are you perplexed whether or not one should 
say that there is a separate form for each of these too, a form that 
again is other than the sorts of things we handle? 
Not at all, said Socrates. Surely these things are just what we see them 
to be: it would be too absurd to suppose that something is a form for 
them. Still, I sometimes worry lest what holds in one case may not 
hold in all; but then, when I take that stand, I retreat, for fear of 
tumbling undone into depths of nonsense. So I go back to the things 
we just said had forms, and spend my time dealing with them.  
You are still young, Socrates, said Parmenides, and philosophy has 
not yet taken hold of you as I think it one day will. You will despise 
none of these things then. But as it is, because of your youth, you still 
pay attention to the opinions of human beings. (130a8-e4 translation 
by R. E. Allen, slightly modified)3 
9 Parmenides here presents Socrates with four distinct categories of features or 
entities4 and asks him whether or not he posits separate forms for each of them. 
To begin with, we need to discuss in detail what features or entities each category 
                                                             
3 ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιος εἶ ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. καί μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω 
διῄρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; καί τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι 
αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἓν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ Ζήνωνος 
ἤκουες; – ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. – ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον δικαίου τι εἶδος 
αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων; – ναί, φάναι. – τί δ᾽, ἀνθρώπου εἶδος 
χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος; – ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, 
φάναι, πολλάκις δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως. 
– ἦ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι 
ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἑκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, ὂν ἄλλο αὖ 
τῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή; – οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν γε ἅπερ 
ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ᾖ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε 
μή τι ᾖ περὶ πάντων ταὐτόν· ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μή ποτε εἴς τινα βυθὸν 
φλυαρίας ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ· ἐκεῖσε δ᾽ οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εἴδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα 
πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω. – νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὔπω σου 
ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ᾽ ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις: νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς 
ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. 
4 I prefer to use ‘features’ or ‘entities’ rather than the fairly common term ‘concepts’, since the 
question is not whether or not there are forms for certain concepts, but rather whether certain 
features of things and certain entities have a separate form or essence or not. 
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is meant to single out, both for the purpose of arguing against a widespread 
developmental account of this passage in particular and of Plato’s later thought 
more generally, and for the purpose of achieving a better understanding of the 
problem that Parmenides is pointing to in the passage. 
10 The first category includes certain very general features, such as unity, plurality, 
and likeness, while the second includes entities such as the just, beauty and the 
good. In the scholarly literature, the features included in the first category are 
often claimed to correspond to mathematical or logical forms (see e.g. Ross 1951, 
84; Miller 1986, 44), in contrast to the entities contained in the second category 
that are supposed to correspond to moral forms (see e.g. Cornford 1939, 81-82; 
Zekl 1972, 131n20; Scolnicov 2003, 54; Scolnicov prefers the term ‘axiological 
concepts’). It is further commonly assumed that the entities of the second 
category reflect the interests of the Socrates we find in Plato’s supposedly early 
dialogues (Ross 1951, 85), or, alternatively, the historical Socrates, with which the 
Socrates of these dialogues is often identified, while the features contained in the 
first are often claimed to have been included as forms, in addition to the moral 
forms, by Plato from the Meno onward (see Friedländer 1960, 178-169; Cornford 
1939, 82; Scolnicov 2003, 54). This in turn, it is sometimes suggested, explains 
why Socrates in the Parmenides so readily accepts that there are forms for the 
features and entities contained in the first two categories – these are the entities 
and features that Plato’s Socrates was preoccupied with in the early and middle 
period dialogues –, and also why he is reluctant to accept forms for the latter two 
– these are entities that only came to stand at the center of Plato’s later thought 
where “the doctrine of Forms” was “applied to the explanation of ‘the whole of 
nature’”; this supposedly constituted an ontological reorientation that turned the 
“question of their [i.e. the Forms] extent” into “a problem” (Cornford 1939, 83).5  
11 This account of the content of the four categories is, however, misleading on 
several counts, and the explanation advanced for Socrates’ willingness to posit 
forms for the first two categories but not for the last two is not convincing. 
12 First, it is misleading to call features such as unity, plurality, and likeness 
mathematical or logical (see Allen 1997, 119; see also Gill 2012, 28-29). As the 
                                                             
5 This view of Plato’s development was, as far as I know, originally advanced by Julius Stenzel, 
who regards the passage 130a8-e4 as “die von Platon selbst gegebenen Darstellung der Genesis der 
Ideenlehre” (1917, 27). See also Ross 1951, 85 and Hackforth 1972, 134-136. Charles Kahn 
follows Stenzel’s and Cornford’s overall interpretative framework and suggests (2013, xii) that 
most of the dialogues now commonly regarded as late (the Laws is not discussed by Kahn) “are 
best seen as moments in a single project: namely, the coming to terms with natural philosophy on 
the basis of a system of thought (the Theory of Ideas) that had been worked out in earlier dialogues, 
with a different set of problems in view”; more precisely, Kahn claims (2013, 7) that Plato “only 
later, in the Philebus and the Timaeus” undertook “to apply his theory [of ideas] to the philosophy 
of nature”.    
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Theaetetus suggests, Plato rather regarded them as ontological features common 
to anything that exists (185c4-5).6 We may call them ‘categorial’ forms,7 as long as 
we do not imply by this designation that Plato draws a sharp distinction between 
these types of forms or essences and others, and may regard them as the kind of 
features that formal ontology would concentrate its efforts on. We should also 
note that most of the Parmenides as well as sections of the Theaetetus and the 
Sophist are devoted to exploring such formal or categorial features.   
13 Second, while many modern critics have been tempted to think of ‘just’, ‘beauty’, 
and ‘good’ as moral, normative, or axiological forms or concepts, or simply as 
values, and to contrast them with the supposedly more neutral or factual forms of 
the first category, this manner of thinking about the features and entities of the 
first two categories is unsatisfactory. For while terms such as ‘just’, ‘beauty’ and 
‘good’ may be described as in one sense evaluative,8 Greek thinkers would hardly 
have understood them primarily as designating moral qualities, to say nothing of 
values in a modern sense. To Plato and Aristotle at least, ‘good’ designates an 
objective determination of a being that is no less ontological than ‘unity’ is – if 
something is good, i.e. has virtue, it is so because it is able to perform its work or 
job (ergon) well, whether it be a knife, a horse, or a human being (see e.g. Resp. 
335b8-11, 353b2-12; Gorg. 506d2-8, EN 1098a7-17; for further discussion, see 
Stenzel 1917, 4-19, and Ross 1951, 43). Likewise ‘beauty’ first and foremost 
designates an objective quality of something; a beautiful deed is beautiful because 
of its intrinsic quality, just as a beautiful horse is. Even ‘just’ is first and foremost 
                                                             
6 At 185c9-d2, Theaetetus lists being (ousia) and non-being, similarity and dissimilarity, 
identity and difference, unity and the other numbers, as examples of such common features. They 
seem closely related to the great kinds discussed in the Sophist. For discussion of the connection 
between the Parmenides and the “common terms” of the Theaetetus, see Allen 1997, 119-121 and 
Gill 2012, 28-29. 
7 Martin Heidegger suggests that Plato, by turning these common features into objects of 
investigation in the Theaetetus and the Sophist, discovers the categorial determinations of being, 
and that he thereby both develops a distinction between beings and being already latent in 
Parmenides’ thought and foreshadows the later thought of Kant and, in particular, Husserl; see 
Heidegger 2004, 123 with 60-61 and 65-70; see also 261-262 and 272-273. Worth noting is that 
Heidegger at the same time criticizes the Neo-Kantian tendency to assimilate Plato’s concerns in 
these dialogues too closely with those of Kant; see Myles Burnyeat 1976, 49-50 for a related, but 
also less careful reliance on Kantian and Neo-Kantian concepts in the interpretation of Plato. 
Gilbert Ryle instead terms the features of the first category “formal concepts” (1939, 146); while 
he in my view is wrong in regarding them as concepts, he is right in emphasizing that they are “not 
peculiar to any special subject matter, but integral to all subject matters” (see also the afterword 
written in 1963, printed in Allen 1965, 145-47, where Ryle discusses them under the heading of 
ubiquitous concepts). For an interesting discussion of the place these terms hold in Plato’s thought 
and how they may be said to approach, but still differ from, Aristotle’s categories, see Campbell 
1867, xvi-xix (general introduction). 
8 By this expression I do not mean to suggest any contrast between facts and values, or an 
“ontology of values”, but merely that the terms are used by Greek thinkers to evaluate something 
as good and to contrast it to what is bad.  
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an objective determination of regimes, souls, and actions, not a moral concept or 
a value. On the other hand, unity is certainly often used as an evaluative term by 
both Plato and Aristotle. What motivates many modern critics to interpret the 
difference between the first two categories as a difference between logical-
mathematical and moral concepts or forms is most probably a reliance, conscious 
or unconscious, on modern distinctions such as those between “facts” and 
“values”, the “is” and the “ought”. But such distinctions are foreign to Greek 
thought and they blur, rather than illuminate, Plato’s often subtle ontological 
investigations.  
14 In addition to depending on misleading descriptions of the content of the first 
two categories, the developmental account of the passage just sketched is also open 
to criticism because it rests on the mistaken, if very common, suggestion that the 
Socrates we find in Plato’s supposedly early dialogues was preoccupied merely 
with the entities of the second category, and that Plato later, after having posited 
forms for such entities, from the Meno onward added to them the “mathematical” 
ones corresponding to the features of the first category. First, while the Socrates 
we meet in the supposedly early dialogues often asks about virtues, whether and 
how they can be acquired, and what constitutes human happiness, he never 
inquires in any rigorous manner into a form of the good – this he only seems to 
do in the Republic and, perhaps, the Philebus, or the just – this he only does in the 
Republic. Inquiries into the beautiful, on the other hand, are found in many 
dialogues, in particular in the Symposium, the Phaedrus, the Philebus, and the 
Hippias Major. Second, it is not true that unity, plurality, and difference are 
added as forms to the “moral” forms in the Meno and supposedly later dialogues. 
At a general level they may be said to be discussed throughout Plato’s dialogues 
(e.g. in the Protagoras at 329d3-330b3 or the Hippias Major at 300e3-302b3), as 
is only to be expected since such general features are bound to come up for 
discussion in some way or another in any ontological inquiry. A rigorous inquiry 
into such features, on the other hand, is found only in dialogues now commonly 
regarded as among the later of the dialogues of the middle period, especially the 
Theaetetus and the Parmenides, or in dialogues now commonly regarded as late, 
especially the Timaeus, the Sophist and the Statesman. The contents of the first 
category, then, can be said to play a role in several dialogues that are regarded as 
early, even though they are explicit objects of inquiry only in the dialogues now 
commonly regarded as middle and late, while the contents of the second category 
may be said to be objects of inquiry in all Plato’s dialogues, with the discussion in 
the Republic and possibly in the Philebus standing out from the rest.  
15 Turning now to the third and fourth categories, we see that they include natural 
entities such as human beings, water, and fire, on the one hand, and hair, mud, 
and dirt, on the other. According to the developmental account of the passage, 
these two categories exemplify the things Plato’s interest gravitated toward in his 
later period when he turned his attention from the moral questions characteristic 
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of Socrates to questions concerning nature in general;9 but this description of 
Plato’s attitude toward the content of these categories is again highly misleading.  
16 Concerning the third category we may note that Socrates in the Phaedo, for 
instance, proposes that there is a form for fire (105c2), while he in the Meno seems 
to suggest that there is an essence for bees (72b1-7). There is accordingly nothing 
to suggest that the Socrates found in dialogues commonly assumed to be earlier 
than the Parmenides could not consider forms for natural things possible (see 
Allen 1997, 122), even though it is true that such entities are not central to the 
inquiries found in any of these dialogues. It should at the same time be emphasized 
that such entities do not take center stage in any of the dialogues now commonly 
regarded as late either, with the exception of the Timaeus, and it is hardly 
surprising that they are central to the inquiry of this dialogue, devoted as it is to 
explaining (in mythical terms) the origin of the physical world.10 In other words, 
the way in which natural things are discussed in the Platonic corpus as such does 
not lend support to the view that Plato’s later dialogues, in contrast to the earlier 
ones, document a newly developed interest in nature as a whole. What seems to 
motivate this claim is the view that the Timaeus is the crowning achievement of 
his later thought and the concomitant view that the supposed change in 
ontological outlook brings Plato closer to modern natural science and logic and 
thus demonstrates his growing maturity.11  
17 With regard to the fourth category, finally, we may note that while mud is briefly 
discussed in the Theaetetus (see 147a1-c6) and hair in the Timaeus (76b1-d3), dirt 
is never discussed elsewhere in Plato. Nor are we told in the Theaetetus, the 
Timaeus or anywhere else that there are forms for mud or hair, perhaps for the 
perfectly good reason that Plato regarded mud as a mixture of water and earth (see 
                                                             
9 The oldest systematic defense of this view is, to my knowledge, Stenzel 1917, see in particular 
3-18 and 45-54; both Gill 2012 and Kahn 2013 are recent studies that remain within the general 
outline of this developmental account. 
10 It may be true that also other supposedly late dialogues display a greater interest in the 
question how one may explain the generation of the natural world and natural things than many 
of the supposedly earlier dialogues. Nevertheless, the only passages in these dialogues that appear 
to discuss this question in a rigorous, philosophical manner are passages from the Philebus (at 
24a6-27c2) and the Sophist (at 219a5-b2) and these do not seem to warrant the claim that Plato in 
the supposedly late dialogues suddenly developed an interest in explaining the whole of nature 
through his “theory of ideas” in such a manner that this “theory” was radically changed. In the 
Phaedo too, for instance, the assumption that there are forms is meant to explain the generation of 
natural phenomena (see 103c10-105c7), just as the notion of forms as ordering principles are used 
to explain generation in the Gorgias (see 503d6-504a4).  
11 Gadamer 1991, 339-344 thus correctly emphasizes the tacit German idealistic and neo-
Kantian assumptions about the close connection between modern (mathematical) natural science 
and Plato underlying various modern approaches to Plato, including the developmental approach 
to the later Plato for which especially Julius Stenzel paved the way. 
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Tht. 147c3-6) and hair as a mixture of skin and water (see Tim. 76b1-c1). It is in 
fact hard to see what philosophical reasons should have prompted him to posit 
forms for such composites of natural ‘stuff’12 – except the view sometimes 
ascribed to Plato that all common names must have forms corresponding to them, 
presumably as a result of the assumption that forms are Plato’s “interpretation” 
of concepts and that all names have concepts corresponding to them.13  
18 As Julius Stenzel has pointed out, however, albeit in order to argue a very different 
point than the one argued here, the passage we are considering in the Parmenides 
shows beyond doubt that Socrates in this dialogue does not hold the view that 
forms are concepts or what concepts designate; otherwise his objection to the 
suggestion that mud or hair should have separate forms would not make any sense 
(Stenzel 1917, 28). Stenzel, however, regarded the young Socrates as a dramatic 
character representing Plato’s earlier view of forms, a view Plato abandoned from 
the Parmenides onward. But a complex passage in the Statesman that discusses 
the difference between forms and parts and the way common names are related to 
both (see 262c3-263b12) suggests that Plato when writing that dialogue regarded 
the view that forms simply correspond to what concepts designate as misguided, 
or at least saw a point in portraying his Eleatic visitor as regarding it as such; for 
the Eleatic visitor emphatically stresses that while certain names such as 
“barbarian” or “brute animal” may be said to correspond to parts of a whole, 
namely “human beings” and “living beings”, they do not correspond to forms. 
Since the Statesman according to the traditional developmental view of Plato held 
by Stenzel is later than the Parmenides, this fact speaks strongly against the 
suggestion advanced by Stenzel and those critics who follow him that Plato in the 
Parmenides meant to criticize the view ascribed to Socrates, and then in the 
supposedly later dialogues through his Eleatic visitor defended a new 
understanding of forms according to which they were something closer to 
concepts. 
19 We may now conclude that the developmental reading of the passage according 
to which it signals a change in Plato’s ontological orientation is not supported by 
the content of the categories. We have also argued that this reading is motivated 
by views of Plato’s supposed development that rest on philosophical assumptions 
about the general nature of universals and concepts and the importance of natural 
entities wholly foreign to Plato. To this point we may add that, had Plato really 
wanted to indicate such a change, his choice of depicting Socrates as very young 
                                                             
12 Harte 2008, 194 observes that “where there is no theoretical work for Forms to do, there is 
no reason to posit them.” See also McCabe 1994, 80. 
13 Ross 1951, 85 and many later critics have ascribed this view to Plato, often based on passages 
from the Republic, in particular 596a6; Neo-Kantians like Paul Natorp have likewise taken for 
granted that Platonic forms were concepts. 
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in the dialogue would be almost impossible to understand. If he had wanted to 
tell his readers that he, from the time he wrote the Parmenides and onward, was 
leaving his Socratic heritage behind, it would have been much more effective 
simply to leave this Socrates behind and introduce his Eleatic visitor, his Athenian 
visitor and his Timaeus to take over.14 By depicting Socrates as young in the 
Parmenides, Plato seems to indicate that whatever may be at fault with Socrates’ 
attitude toward the four categories, it has to do with his youthful understanding 
of them rather than with a view of forms that Plato also ascribes to a (dramatically 
speaking) much older Socrates in for instance the Phaedo or the Republic.15  
20 In order to reach a positive understanding of the philosophical point Plato is 
making in the passage, we now need to analyze in greater detail the dramatic 
interplay between Socrates and Parmenides. We start by looking at the reasons 
Socrates advances for positing forms for some of the categories but not for others, 
and then proceed to the question what Parmenides finds problematic in Socrates’ 
response to his questions. 
21 We may first note that Socrates does not offer any explicit reasons for positing 
forms for likeness, unity, and plurality, or for the just, the good, or beauty. Nor 
does he offer any reasons for his being in perplexity (en aporia[i]; 130c3) about 
whether there are forms for human beings, fire, and water. But he does offer a 
reason for the claim that he is not in perplexity at all about whether there are forms 
for hair, mud, and dirt – for they are just as we see them (tauta men ge haper 
horômen, tauta kai einai), he claims, and it would be absurd (atopos) to assume a 
separate form for them (130d3-5). The reason he offers for not assuming forms 
for such things may also suggest to us the reason Socrates is so ready to assume 
forms for the features and entities of the first and second category – these are not 
as we see them –, and why he is hesitant about the entities of the third category – 
they are perhaps as we see them, and perhaps not.16 This line of reasoning is not 
too hard to follow; it may be regarded as expressing something like a 
phenomenological observation. In general people do not assume, or at least not 
on their own, prior to being influenced by philosophical or scientific views, that 
there exist separate forms for entities such as dirt and the like, since these things 
seem to be nothing more than what we see them to be. On the other hand, some 
people at least may be tempted to assume that separate forms in one sense or 
another must exist for features or entities such as unity or goodness. For upon 
                                                             
14 See Dorter 1994, 19-20 for a similar observation.  
15 Erler 2007, 17, suggests that the fact that Plato, in choosing to depict Socrates as very young 
in the Parmenides and to defend a view similar to the one he puts forward in the Parmenides as an 
old man in the Phaedo, should be regarded as “literarischer Hinweis und Warnung Platons an die 
Interpreten …, nicht unbedingt von einem Umdenken Platons auszugehen.” He concludes: “Die 
Wiederlegung der Ideenlehre ist nicht das letzte Wort Platons und damit endgültig.” 
16 I thank Vasilis Politis for drawing my attention to the importance of this point. 
 
Eleaticism and Socratic Dialectic: On Ontology, Philosophical Inquiry,  
and Estimations of Worth in Plato’s Parmenides, Sophist and Statesman 
 
Études platoniciennes, 15  2019 
11 
consideration, we may come to realize that things we judge to be unities or to be 
good never truly express unity or goodness as such, but that we are nevertheless 
able to evaluate them as more or less unitary, or more or less good, and that this 
implies that both unity and goodness somehow exist separate from the things we 
regard as unities or as good (cf. Phaedo 74a9-75b9).   
22 If this interpretation is correct, we see that Socrates’ reasons for assuming separate 
forms for certain entities or features but not for others are philosophically well-
motivated and not simply naïve, as some commentators have suggested (Zekl 
1972, 131n20),17 even if they are not spelled out in such detail as they are in for 
instance the Phaedo and the Republic, and even if they will hardly suffice for 
convincing someone who denies that forms exists at all that he or she should posit 
forms for at least certain features or entities. 
23 Let us now turn to the objection Parmenides levels at Socrates. It contains three 
connected claims, namely i) that Socrates is still young and has not yet been 
sufficiently gripped by philosophy, ii) that, should philosophy eventually grip 
him, he will not dishonor any of the things mentioned in the fourth category, and 
iii) that he still pays too much attention to human opinions because of his age. 
The phrasing of this objection, in turn, seems closely connected to the manner in 
which Parmenides introduced the fourth category of things, where he stated (at 
130c5-7) that “they could really seem ridiculous: hair and mud and dirt, for 
example, or anything else that is utterly worthless and trivial.”  
24 In this passage Parmenides recognizes that the things contained in the fourth 
category are worthless and trivial (atimotaton te kai phaulotaton), and that they 
for this reason may seem ridiculous (geloia doxeien an einai), while he at the same 
time suggests that it is unphilosophical to dishonor (atimazein) them. He also 
implies that Socrates regards them as ridiculous because of his age and because of 
a general tendency to pay too much attention to human opinions. What follows 
from this, however, is only that Socrates, according to Parmenides, will stop 
dishonoring lowly matters if he becomes truly philosophical, not that he will start 
regarding them as important (Parmenides regards them as worthless and trivial) or 
that he will have to “dignify” them “with Ideas” (the expression is taken from 
Allen 1997, 119).  
25 As a result of the developmental account of the passage discussed above, however, 
the notion that Parmenides in fact urges Socrates to posit forms for dirt and the 
like has become rather common (Stenzel 1917, 28; Zekl 1972, 131n20; Dorter 
1994, 26; Allen 1997, 123). A strong reason for rejecting this, apart from the 
simple observation that Parmenides never states that Socrates will posit forms for 
these things, is that Parmenides is noncommittal with respect to the question 
whether there are forms or not for the three previous categories. He simply raises 
                                                             
17 See also Allen 1997, 123 who states that Socrates’ “rejection of separate Ideas of hair, mud, 
and dirt is philosophically clumsy”. 
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the question concerning each category, but he neither confirms nor dismisses 
Socrates’ answers. Moreover, in the next section of the dialogue Parmenides 
proceeds to raise a number of critical objections to the assumption that there are 
separate forms at all. What reasons should he then have for urging Socrates to posit 
separate forms in particular for hair, dirt, and mud? 
26 On the basis of these considerations it seems more reasonable to assume that 
Parmenides is simply urging Socrates to consider more carefully what reasons he 
has for rejecting forms for things that are trivial and lowly and, more generally, 
what reasons he has for positing forms for any of the categories.18 In fact, the claim 
that Socrates pays too much attention to human opinions could be taken to 
suggest that Socrates has given the question what reasons he has for positing forms 
for features and entities such as unity and goodness too little attention, precisely 
because they are held in higher regard by most people. The suggestion Parmenides 
is making in the passage taken as a whole would then amount to the following: 
Socrates should stop disregarding what is lowly, he should give the question why 
he posits forms for some entities and not for others much more thought, and, 
perhaps most importantly, he should realize that common opinions concerning 
what is high and what is low are not a reliable guide when settling such difficult 
questions.  
27 If this interpretation is correct, we may conclude that Parmenides is not 
recommending a “value-neutral” or “natural” ontology at all, but only a much 
more careful approach to the task of settling fundamental ontological questions. 
As we shall see, moreover, the passages concerning philosophic method from the 
Sophist and the Statesman that are commonly seen as connected to the passage 
from the Parmenides considered above suggest that Plato regarded this 
philosophical outlook as characteristic of an Eleatic approach to inquiry; closer 
considerations of the purpose of these passages in the two dialogues will also 
demonstrate that it is an outlook strikingly similar to one that Plato portrays his 
Socrates as being a proponent of.    
Part II: The ideal of inquiry of the Eleatic 
visitor and its ontological implications  
28 Parmenides’ remarks concerning the attitude Socrates should adopt when he 
considers the scope of the assumption that there are forms seem related to some 
remarks on method made by the Eleatic Visitor in the Sophist (at 227a10-b6) and 
the Statesman (at 266d7-10).19 This part of the article analyzes these remarks with 
a view to their relation to the Parmenides and to the overall aim of the inquiry of 
the Sophist and the Statesman. Prior to this analysis, a few observations concerning 
                                                             
18 See Scolnicov 2003, 55 for a related reading. 
19 See the discussion below. 
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the connection between the Parmenides and the Sophist and Statesman are called 
for.  
29 Within 20th century Plato scholarship it has been common to read the Parmenides 
as closely connected to the Theaetetus, the Sophist and the Statesman (see 
Cornford 1935, 1; Gill 2012, 1-3).20 On the one hand the four dialogues are clearly 
connected through inter-textual references (for details, see Cornford 1935, 1), on 
the other Parmenides and the Eleatic tradition stand at the center in these 
dialogues, so much so that some or all have been referred to as Plato’s ‘Eleatic 
dialogues’ (see Stenzel 1917, 29; Gadamer 1991, 338-340; Dorter 1994, ix), and 
they have been thought of as bearing witness to an interest in Eleatic thought 
developed only in Plato’s later years (Ross 1951, 6-9, 83; see also Ryle 1939, 130). 
A common assumption has been that the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman are 
meant to be responses to the criticism of forms found in the Parmenides and that 
the three dialogues seek to address various problems inherent in the conception of 
forms found the Phaedo and the Republic that are pointed out in the Parmenides 
(this view is argued for in detail in Stenzel 1917), although critics have not agreed 
on the question how they address them.  
30 Analytically oriented critics influenced by the work of G. E. L. Owen, Richard 
Robinson, and Gilbert Ryle tend to regard the four dialogues as belonging to a 
series of late, critical dialogues. The Parmenides opens this series, they claim, by 
rejecting transcendent forms, a rejection that leads Plato to develop his ontology, 
his epistemology, and his practical-political thought in new directions as 
documented by the Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philebus.21 
                                                             
20 The idea of reading these dialogues systematically in the light of one another, as well as the 
notion that they announce a new “theory of ideas” that stands in contrast to an older theory 
culminating in the Phaedo and the Republic, probably goes back to six articles published by Henry 
Jackson from 1882 to 1886, but see also some remarks in Campbell 1867, ii-iv (general 
introduction), lx (introduction to the Sophist) and lvi-lvii (introduction to the Statesman). 
Jackson’s articles have had some impact on later accounts of Plato’s supposed development, as can 
be seen from e.g. Ross 1951, 101. See Jackson 1885, 242-243 for a general overview of Jackson’s 
account of this development. Unlike analytical philosophers of the 20th century, who would come 
to view Plato’s later dialogues as departing from a metaphysical strain in his earlier dialogues and 
as introducing a more linguistically and logically oriented conception of philosophy (see e.g. Ryle 
1939 and Owen 1953), Jackson saw Plato’s development as culminating in a “theory of natural 
kinds having for its basis a thoroughgoing idealism” (Jackson 1885, 243). For a discussion of 
Jackson’s position, see Sweeney 1975, especially 193-195. For a more recent discussion of Plato’s 
supposed development, see Thesleff 2014. 
21 A restatement of this older view that became classical for the analytic school is found in 
Owen 1953, in which the aim is to argue that the Timaeus does not number among Plato’s later 
dialogues; McCabe 1994, Lane 1998, Gill 2012, and Hestir 2016 all depend in various ways on 
Owen’s general understanding of the remaining “critical”, supposedly later dialogues. The main 
elements of this view of Plato’s development can be traced back to Campbell 1867, see ii-iv (general 
introduction) for the overall connection between the dialogues Owen calls “critical” and xix-xxiii 
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Many critics in this tradition have further assumed that the arguments of these 
dialogues demonstrate that the later Plato at least in part outgrew his Socratic 
heritage and that this is why Plato introduced new leading interlocutors in his 
supposedly late dialogues, with the Philebus being the exception that proves the 
rule – when the subject matter to be discussed is ethical, Socrates can still be used 
as main interlocutor.22 In the words of Gilbert Ryle, Socrates plays “so slight a part 
in the Parmenides, Sophist, and Politicus, and so slight also is the positive role given 
to any known Socratic theories in those dialogues or in the Theaetetus, that the 
natural inference would surely be that Plato had discovered that certain important 
philosophic truths or methods were to be credited not to Socrates but to the 
Eleatics” (1939, 130).23  
31 This approach to the ‘Eleatic dialogues’ is anticipated in the work of Julius Stenzel, 
especially in his early work Studien zur Entwicklung der Platonischen Dialektik. 
This study has had a strong influence on German scholarship and also a certain 
impact on anglophone scholarship,24 becoming a major force behind the 
developmental reading of the passages in the Parmenides discussed above. In this 
study Stenzel urged that Plato’s dialogues may roughly be divided into two main 
periods; a first period culminates in the Republic and is characterized by the fact 
that forms are closely associated with the virtue that expresses the perfection of 
something and hence with absolute values (Stenzel 1917, 3-19), a result of Plato’s 
Socratic orientation in this period; by contrast, the second is initiated by the 
critique found in the Parmenides of such forms, and is characterized by the fact 
that forms now come to serve the wholly new purpose of explaining everything 
                                                             
(general introduction) for some brief remarks on stylistic similarities that according to Campbell 
support the idea that they embody a separate, late period in Plato’s thought. Owen’s view of the 
place of the Timaeus remains idiosyncratic, standing in contrast with the tradition going back to 
Lewis Campbell. The fullest criticism of Owen’s argument is found in Cherniss 1957, which also 
opposes more generally the notion that Plato rejected transcendent forms in the so-called critical 
dialogues.  
22 This view of Plato’s use of dramatic characters was, as far as I know, first introduced by 
Julius Stenzel in his ‘Literarische Form und philosophischer Gehalt des Platonischen Dialoges’ 
from 1916, see Stenzel 1917, 123-141 and also Stenzel 1917, 5; Stenzel was partly anticipated by 
Campbell, see Campbell 1867 xx-xxii (general introduction). A view similar to that of Stenzel was 
advanced in Taylor 1961, 5 and has also recently been advanced in Kahn 2013. 
23 For a recent discussion of Plato’s relation to Parmenides that emphasizes the importance of 
Parmenides more generally for Plato’s metaphysics, see Palmer 1999. See also Berti 1987, especially 
67-101.   
24 Both F. M. Cornford and Richard Robinson take cues from the work of Julius Stenzel as 
do Alexander Nehamas; see Cornford 1935, 266n1, and 268n1; Robinson 1941a, 6; Robinson 
1941b, 542-544; and Nehamas 1999, 222n38, 244n39. Martin Heidegger likewise build part of his 
early interpretation of Plato on Stenzel, see Heidegger 2004, 113-114.  
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there is (Stenzel 1917, 28).25 As a result of this new purpose, forms are no longer 
associated with virtues or regarded as values, but come more closely to resemble 
concepts (Stenzel 1917, 25-31). Stenzel finds this shift in Plato’s ontological 
outlook indicated in two ways; first in Plato’s introduction of new main 
interlocutors (Stenzel 1917, 5), and second in the passages regarding method from 
the Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Statesman we are concerned with in this 
article. These passages, according to Stenzel, express Plato’s new aim of 
“comprehend[ing] everything without concern for value” (1917, 28).26 
According to Stenzel, this aim also resulted in a change in Plato’s conception of 
dialectic: whereas dialectic up until and including the Republic was essentially 
connected to the form of the good, it is now turned into a kind of “logic” that is 
free from any connection to the good and is concerned with a concept of being 
that is “liberated” from all teleological overtones (Stenzel 1917, 38-39). 
32 Both of the approaches just sketched seem unable to account for some basic 
dramatic features of the so-called Eleatic dialogues, however, and this gives us 
reasons prima facie for doubting the validity of their differing accounts of Plato’s 
development. First, that Plato portrays Socrates as quite young in the Parmenides 
and as being taught how to conduct philosophical inquiry by the old Parmenides, 
and that he has Socrates recall this (probably fictive) meeting with pleasure as an 
old man in both the Theaetetus (183e5-184a2) and the Sophist (217c3-7), suggest 
that Plato wanted to indicate a close connection between Parmenides and 
Socrates, whether that connection existed in fact or not. In the second place, both 
the fact that Socrates expresses gratitude toward Theodorus for introducing him 
to Theaetetus and the Eleatic visitor at the beginning of the Statesman (257a1-2), 
and the fact that Theodorus, at the beginning of the Sophist, assures Socrates that 
the visitor, while being a friend of those who associate with Parmenides and Zeno, 
is no eristic but rather a very philosophical man (216a2-4, b7-c1) suggest that Plato 
wanted his readers to regard the visitor’s conception of philosophy as closely 
related to that of Socrates (see Cornford 1935, 169-170). Through these dramatic 
devices, it seems, Plato wanted to indicate that an intimate connection existed 
between Eleatic and Socratic ideals of inquiry, and further that the Eleatic ideal 
somehow served as a basis for those of his Socrates, rather than that the former 
ideal superseded or stood in contrast to the latter.27 
                                                             
25 A similar view was, as mentioned above, later advanced in Cornford 1939, 83, and was 
recently restated in Kahn 2013. 
26 Stenzel’s emphasis of the connection between these passages and Plato’s supposedly later 
ontology was later accepted by, among others, W. K. C. Guthrie; see Guthrie 1978, 40 
27 For a very different understanding of the role Plato ascribes to the figure of Parmenides, see 
Ferrari 2009. Ferrari suggests that Parmenides, as portrayed by Plato, is a philosopher wholly 
incapable of understanding the theory of forms since he consistently treats them as entities in space 
and time; related readings are advanced by Zekl 1972 and Miller 1985. For a more general 
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33 One might object, as a number of critics inspired by the work of Stanley Rosen 
have in recent decades, that Plato meant his readers to see that Socrates’ praise of 
Parmenides and the Eleatic visitor is ironical and that the Socratic approach to 
philosophy differs radically from the Eleatic approach (see Rosen 1983, e.g. 8-11, 
and Rosen 1995, e.g. 14-18).28 But for this objection to carry weight it would have 
to be shown that there are significant methodical and doctrinal differences 
between Plato’s Socrates and the Eleatic philosophers as portrayed in his 
dialogues, which could then make intelligible an ironical reading of this kind.  
34 An adequate discussion of this greater question lies beyond the scope of the 
present article. Here we will limit ourselves to looking at the passages in the Sophist 
and Statesman highlighted by both Julius Stenzel and Stanley Rosen as indicating 
such a difference. It will be argued that Stenzel was right in insisting that they 
indicate an idea of philosophical inquiry closely related to that expressed by 
Parmenides in the passage discussed in part I, but wrong in regarding them as 
indicating any significant change either in Plato’s ontological or methodical 
orientation. Since the same passages are used by most critics who, following 
Rosen, advocate an ironic reading of Socrates’ attitude toward the Eleatic 
tradition, this argument will also constitute a partial refutation of their approach 
to the Eleatic dialogues. 
35 The passage from the Sophist runs as follows: 
… in our pursuit through accounts, it matters not a bit less, or indeed 
any more, whether we’re dealing with sponging people down or 
administering medicines, or whether the cleansing in question does 
us a little good or a lot. Our method aims at acquiring understanding, 
by attempting for all arts to grasp what is akin and what is not akin, 
and for this purpose it honors them all equally and supposes some 
not at all more ridiculous than others in respect of their similarity, 
and it won’t treat someone who illuminates hunting through 
generalship rather than nit-picking as somehow more impressive, but 
rather, other things being equal, as empty-headed. (227a7-b6, 
translation by Christopher Rowe, modified)29 
                                                             
discussion of Plato’s use of Parmenides in his (fictional) biography of Socrates, see Erler 2007, 
especially 16-19. See also Zuckert 2009 on the biography of Socrates. 
28 Views building on Stanley Rosen’s view of the difference between Socrates and Eleatic 
thought (or more precisely, between Socrates and the Eleatic visitor) was later elaborated in 
Hyland 2004 and Ambuel 2007. Dorter 1994 and Gonzalez 2009 likewise take Rosen’s 
understanding of the Sophist and Statesman as their point of departure, although both modify 
Rosen’s understanding of the Eleatic visitor significantly. 
29 ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον 
τυγχάνει μέλον εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαῖρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκα νοῦν 
πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ 
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36 The passage from the Statesman, which comments on the methodos used in the 
Sophist, runs as follows: 
… in this sort of pursuit through accounts, there was no care for what 
was dignified any more than for what wasn’t, and it didn’t dishonor 
the small in favor of the great, but on its own terms always reaches 
what is most true. (266d7-10, translation by Eva Brann, Peter 
Kalkavage, and Eric Salem)30 
37 A comparison between what Parmenides says when introducing the fourth 
category of entities in the Parmenides with what the visitor says in these passages 
concerning his methodos tôn logôn demonstrates that the two Eleates have a similar 
attitude toward philosophical inquiry. Parmenides states that there are things that 
could seem ridiculous (geloia doxeien an einai; 130c5-6) that Socrates will 
nevertheless not dishonor (ouden autôn atimaseis) should philosophy grab hold 
of him (130e3). The visitor states in the Sophist that the methodos he and his 
interlocutor pursue does not regard any features of arts it compares as any more 
ridiculous (ouden hêgeitai geloiotera; 227b3-4) than any other, but honors all arts 
equally (tima[i] … ex isou pasas; 227b2) and in the Statesman that it does not 
dishonor what is small in favor of what is great (ton te smikroteron ouden êtimake 
pro tou meizonos; 266d8-9).  
38 In these passages, then, Plato presents us with a philosophical attitude he seems to 
suggest is Eleatic in origin.31 This attitude urges us to i) suspend our ordinary 
estimations of what things are high and important and what things are ridiculous 
and ii) honor things, at least in certain contexts, equally, no matter whether they 
are great or small. It is important to note, however, that in pleading for this 
attitude Parmenides and the Eleatic visitor are not proponents of a non-
teleological, value-neutral ontology, as Stenzel suggested, and further that the 
methodos of the visitor does not urge one, as Stanley Rosen claims, “to disregard 
the honorable altogether” (1983, 119n1) or generally to “ignore the difference of 
worse from better” (1983, 11).32  
                                                             
θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδεν ἡγεῖται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς 
ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. 
30 ὅτι τῇ τοιᾷδε μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὔτε σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν ἢ μή, τόν τε σμικρότερον 
οὐδὲν ἠτίμακε πρὸ τοῦ μείζονος, ἀεὶ δὲ καθ᾽αὑτὴν περαίνει τἀληθέστατον. 
31 See also Phaedrus 261a7-e4, where Socrates introduces an art of rhetoric that he claims is 
one and the same whether it is concerned “with small things” or “with great, and … no more to be 
esteemed in important than in trifling matters” (261a9-b2); this kind of rhetoric is exemplified 
especially by the “Eleatic Palamedes”, Zeno (compare 261b8 with 261d6-8).  
32 This and similar claims lead Rosen and several other critics inspired by his work to claim 
that the method of the Eleatic visitor is fundamentally flawed; by leaving questions of value out of 
his philosophical inquiry, he becomes unable to distinguish philosopher from sophist. See Rosen 
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39 First of all, it is not at all clear that what the visitor is stating in the two passages 
under consideration has a direct bearing on ontology. There is certainly no clear 
connection between his remarks and an “ontology of nature”, as Stenzel and 
others have suggested, for the context makes it perfectly clear that the remarks 
concerning method are primarily meant to have a bearing on the question how we 
are to regard arts or types of expertise. Moreover, it is a real question whether or 
not Plato held the view that there are forms, in the sense of essences, 
corresponding to the various arts;33 at the very least, we may note that arts are not 
mentioned in the four categories considered in the Parmenides where the 
question concerning the scope of forms is raised. The mere fact that Socrates and 
the visitor talk about eidê and genê of arts, and that the visitor is willing to consider 
what (ti pot’ esti) each is (see e.g. Sophist  217a7-9, 217b1-4, 219c2), in itself fails to 
prove that either holds the view that there are essences for arts, and shows only 
that they distinguish between types or kinds of art and find it meaningful to 
discuss what each art is.  
40 Second, it is not correct to claim that Parmenides and the visitor disregard honor 
or “value”; what each urges us to do is rather not to dishonor certain things 
commonly found low and ridiculous, an attitude parallel to the one advocated by 
Aristotle at the beginning of the Parts of Animals (645a15-23);34 the two Eleates 
need not thereby diminish what is high, on the contrary, their main concern seems 
to be to elevate certain things commonly regarded as low.  
41 Third, the visitor’s remarks concerning his methodos in the Sophist are qualified in 
two ways we need to bear in mind in order to understand the aim of this methodos. 
i) It does not simply put everything on a par as Stenzel and Rosen infer, but instead 
honors all arts equally in relation to (pros; 227b2) a specific task, discerning what 
is akin and what is not akin in the arts, and this task in turn is undertaken with a 
view to acquiring understanding. ii) The methodos does not require that we 
assume that no arts are ridiculous, urging us only to regard no art as more 
ridiculous than others kindred with it in respect of their similarity (kata tên 
homoiotêta; 227b3).  
                                                             
1983, 120-121, Hyland 2004, 29, and Gonzalez 2009, 50-51. For a critical assessment of these 
interpretations, see Larsen 2016, 29-43.   
33 It is a notoriously difficult question what ontological status we should ascribe to “the 
objects” divided by the Eleatic visitor in the outer part of the Sophist and in the Statesman, that is, 
the various types of expertise. Are they Platonic forms, essences, or mere concepts or classes? No 
matter how we decide this question, however, it seems clear that types of expertise are not included 
in the ontological discussion found in the Parmenides and that the resolution of this question 
therefore has no immediate bearing on the way we should read the Parmenides passage discussed 
above in part I. For an overview as well as an informative discussion of the question what 
ontological status types of expertise have, see Rowe 1995, 4-8.  
34 The parallel is noted by Zekl 1972, 132n21 
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42 What the two qualifications imply is explained by the example concerning 
hunting that the visitor provides in the Sophist at 227b4-5. A nitpicker, we may 
think, is manifestly less important than a general, and from a certain perspective 
ridiculous (even the notion that there is an art of nitpicking may seem ridiculous, 
as Plato probably recognized; see Campbell 1867, v-vi [general introduction]); but 
the visitor’s point is that, if our purpose is to understand what is akin and what is 
not akin in the arts, i.e. which generic features various arts share and which they 
do not share, we are justified in saying a) that the arts of the general and the 
nitpicker are akin or share a common feature in so far as both perform the same 
activity, hunting, and b) that we may understand equally well what that activity 
of hunting is by looking at a “low” or a “high” practitioner of the activity.  
43 Since the visitor is so careful to make explicit why and to what extent his methodos 
honors all arts equally and regards no feature that arts may share as more ridiculous 
than any other, it seems clear that he does not mean to suggest that the methodos 
precludes that, from another, more everyday35 perspective, some arts may be 
considered ridiculous, others important. What the visitor points out is that we 
should not conduct our ontological or dialectical investigations on the basis of 
this perspective because such a procedure may preclude us from seeing real 
likenesses between arts relevant for understanding their true nature, which is 
probably the situation the vain or empty-headed dialectician mentioned at 227b4-
6 risks being in. On the other hand, the methodos could seem to entail that we 
cannot decide whether an art is important and hence worthy of honor before we 
have decided what type of activity is characteristic of that art and how this activity 
is related to the activities of other arts.  
44 If the last suggestion is along the right lines, we may conclude that there is a further 
resemblance between the philosophical stance of the visitor and that exhibited by 
Parmenides in the passage from the Parmenides analyzed above. In this passage, it 
was argued, Parmenides does not urge Socrates to posit forms for things such as 
mud, dirt, and hair, but rather recommends that, in order to decide whether a 
form should be posited for them or not, Socrates has to consider more carefully 
what reasons he has – apart from common prejudice – for accepting and rejecting 
forms for them. In a similar spirit, what the visitor is suggesting in the Sophist is 
that we should not attempt to decide the question how we are to accord honor to 
various kinds of expertise before having decided the question what similarities and 
differences exist between the kinds.  
45 The suggestion that a consideration of this kind is what motivates the visitor to 
make the remarks on method considered above gains further support if we turn 
to consider the basic problem or aporia the Sophist and the Statesman are meant 
to solve. The overall goal of the two dialogues is to decide a question concerning 
the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher raised by Socrates and elaborated 
                                                             
35 Or from an “ontic” perspective, as we could say with Heideggerian terms. 
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on by the visitor at the beginning of the Sophist. Asked by Socrates whether people 
in Elea think that these men are one, two, or three genê or kinds (217a7-9), the 
visitor states that this question is easy to answer – they think they are three – but 
that it is no small or easy task to distinguish clearly what each is individually (kath’ 
hekaston mên diorisasthai saphôs ti pot’ estin, ou smikron oude rha[i]dion ergon; 
217b2-3). This corollary claim seems to be anticipated by a statement made by 
Socrates a few lines earlier. The philosophical kind (genê), he there states, may be 
as difficult to distinguish (diakrinein) as that of the gods, since philosophers 
appear in all sorts of shapes, not least as a result of the ignorance of others; to some 
they appear to be of no worth (dokousin einai tou mêdenos timioi), to others to be 
worth more than anything (axioi tou pantos), and they appear sometimes as 
statesmen, sometimes as sophists, and sometimes as completely mad (216c2-d2).   
46 The basic problem the discussion in the Sophist and Statesman is explicitly 
intended to solve, then, is to distinguish clearly from each other sophist, statesman, 
and philosopher, i.e. what each is, a problem that apparently arises from the fact 
that philosophers, according to Socrates, commonly appear as what they are not. 
The task imposed upon the visitor is therefore not simply that of looking toward 
three isolated “entities” and defining them in turn, as some of the statements made 
by the visitor and Theodorus could be taken to suggest (see especially Sophist 
218b6-c1 and Statesman 257b7-c2). It is rather that of looking toward a complex 
interconnection between three types of human beings and their proclaimed types 
of expertise36 in order to decide whether they are three entities with three types of 
expertise standing on a par or whether some other connection exists between 
them, such as the one hinted at by Socrates, according to which sophist, 
statesman, and madman are somehow appearances of an underlying original, the 
philosopher.37 Moreover, since Socrates makes clear from the start of the Sophist 
that these appearances result at least in part from the ignorance of others (216c4-
5), and further that others for this reason estimate the relative worth of 
philosophers in radically different ways (216c7-d2), it seems clear that an appeal 
to common opinions about the nature of each type and the relative worth of their 
several activities will not distinguish each clearly or sufficiently from the rest.  
47 We may suggest that, in order for the visitor to complete this task, or to solve this 
aporia, in a satisfactory manner, he needs to make clear what each of the three 
types do, i.e. to what technê or epistêmê they may lay claim and how each kind of 
expertise is related to and differs from the others. This, we may further suggest, is 
why the visitor begins the investigation in both the Sophist and the Statesman by 
dividing art and knowledge into their various kinds, and is also the reason he insists 
                                                             
36 That it is the activity performed by the sophist, contrasted with the activity of the 
philosopher, rather than the sophist and the philosopher themselves that the interlocutors 
undertake to define in the Sophist, is correctly emphasized in Oberhammer 2016, 125-126.    
37 On this point, see also Rosen 1983, 64-66; Benardete 1984 II, 73-75; and Oberhammer 
2016, 99-103, 108-109. 
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that his methodos honors all arts equally with a view to understanding what is alike 
and what is not alike in them. For it is only to the extent that he can show that the 
expertise of sophist, statesman, and philosopher differ significantly from each 
other that he will be able to vindicate the opinion concerning them, namely that 
they are three kinds, held by people in Elea. The existential importance of this task 
is at the same time underscored on the dramatic level by the upcoming trial against 
Socrates, hinted at toward the end of the Theaetetus (210d2-4), which constitutes 
an important background to the entire investigation: as Plato’s Socrates suggests 
in his defense speech, this trial is at least in part the result of a confusion of him 
with certain sophists that goes back at least to Aristophanes (see Apo. 18b4-c1).  
48 If this interpretation of the opening scene of the Sophist and its connection with 
the visitor’s remarks concerning method is correct, we may conclude that the 
passages from the Sophist and the Statesman demonstrate both that the Eleatic 
visitor does not advocate an ontology in the passages we have considered that is at 
odds with the outlook of Plato’s Socrates,38 and that he at a fundamental level is 
in agreement with Socrates concerning the question how philosophical inquiry 
should proceed. The procedure the visitor is pursuing in the two dialogues 
matches the procedure Socrates recommends in the Meno, the Gorgias and the 
Republic, namely, that one has to decide the question what something is before 
one can decide what qualities something has, at least when there appears to be a 
genuine question whether the thing under consideration possesses the qualities in 
question or not (Meno 71b3-7, Gorg. 448d8-448e7, Resp. 354b3-6).39 Moreover, 
in terms of a general approach to philosophical inquiry, this procedure seems 
closely related to the procedure of bracketing opinions concerning the qualities of 
things and in particular common opinions of worth when considering what 
something really is. This is, as we have seen, the implicit recommendation 
Parmenides gives young Socrates in the dialogue that carries his name. Rather than 
heralding a new methodology, we may then conclude, the Parmenides, the 
Sophist, and the Statesman together suggest that this trait of the philosophical 
method characteristic of Plato’s Socrates and central to Plato’s conception of 
dialectic inquiry, is a trait that Plato regarded as being of Eleatic origin40. 
                                                             
38 It is possible to demonstrate that he does not advocate such an ontology in any part of the 
Sophist and Statesman, but this is a complex task presupposing a full-length interpretation of both 
dialogues. 
39 For a thought-provoking argument for the view that it is hard aporiai concerning questions 
of the type “is x y or z” that generates the ti esti question in the so-called Socratic dialogues rather 
than a specifically Platonic or Socratic epistemology, see Politis 2015, especially chapter 1 to 3. My 
analysis of the connection between the opening puzzle of the Sophist and the considerations 
concerning method offered by the visitor is indebted to this account. 
40 I wish to thank Hayden Ausland and Vivil Valvik Haraldsen who both read the article and 
made many helpful suggestions. Special thanks are due Hallvard Fossheim and Vasilis Politis who 
 




ALLEN, R. E., ed. 1965. Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
ALLEN, R. E., trans. 1997. Plato’s Parmenides – Translated with comment, revised 
edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
AMBUEL, David. 2007. Image and Paradigm in Plato's Sophist. Las Vegas: 
Parmenides Publishing.  
BENARDETE, Seth, trans. 1984. The Being of the Beautiful – Plato’s Theaetetus, 
Sophist, and Statesman, Translated and with Commentary. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
BERTI, Enrico. 1987. Contraddizione e dialettica negli antichi e nei moderni. 
Palermo: L’Epos.   
BURNYEAT, Myles. 1976. “Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving.” The Classical 
Quarterly, 26 (1): 29-51. 
CAMPBELL, Lewis, ed. 1867. The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato with a Revised 
Text and English Notes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
CHERNISS, Harold. 1957. “The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato’s Later 
Dialogues.” The American Journal of Philology, 78 (3): 225-266 [reprinted 
in Allen 1965, 339-378 and Cherniss. Selected Papers, ed. L. Tarán. 
Leiden: Brill 1977, 298-339]. 
CORNFORD, Francis MacDonald. 1935. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
CORNFORD, Francis MacDonald. 1939. Plato and Parmenides. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
DORTER, Kenneth. 1994. Form and Good in Plato’s Eleatic Dialogues – The 
Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
ERLER, Michael. 2007. “Biographische Elemente bei Plato und hellenistischer 
Philosophie.” In Griechische Biographie in Hellenistischer Zeit, edited by 
Michael Erler and Stefan Schorn. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter: 
11-24. 
FERRARI, Franco. 2009. “Parmenide ‘antiplatonico’. Riflessioni sul ‘Parmenide’ 
di Platone.”Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale, 51 (2), 315-330. 
FRIEDLÄNDER, Paul. 1960. Platon III. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
GADAMER, Hans-Georg. 1991. “Dialektik ist nicht Sophistik - Theätet lernt das 
im Sophistes.” In Gesammelt Werke 7, 338-369. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck). 
                                                             
read the article several times and helped improve the overall clarity of the argument. I also wish to 
thank the participants at a workshop at the Trinity Plato Center, Trinity College Dublin, who 
commented on an earlier version. The article was written as part of the postdoctoral project 
DICTUM. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research 
and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 750263. 
Eleaticism and Socratic Dialectic: On Ontology, Philosophical Inquiry,  
and Estimations of Worth in Plato’s Parmenides, Sophist and Statesman 
 
Études platoniciennes, 15  2019 
23 
GONZALEZ, Francisco J. 2009. Plato and Heidegger – A Question of Dialogue. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
GILL, Mary Louise. 2012. Philosophos. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
GUTHRIE, W. K. C. 1978. History of Greek Philosophy vol. 5. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
HACKFORTH, Reginald, trans. 1972. Plato's Phaedrus - Translated with an 
Introduction and Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
HARTE, Verity. 2008. “Plato’s Metaphysics.” In The Oxford Handbook of Plato, 
edited by Gail Fine, 191-216. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin. 2004. Gesamtausgabe, band 22: Die Grundbegriffe der 
antiken Philosophie. Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klosterman.  
HESTIR, Blake E. 2016. Plato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and 
Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
HYLAND, Drew. 2004. Questioning Platonism – Continental Interpretations of 
Plato. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
JACKSON, Henry. 1885. “Plato’s Later Theory of Ideas – IV The Theaetetus.” The 
Journal of Philology; 13 (26): 242-272. 
KAHN, Charles H. 2013. Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue – the Return to the 
Philosophy of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
LANE, Melissa. 1998. Method and Politics in Plato’s Statesman. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
LARSEN, Kristian. 2016. “Plato and Heidegger on Sophistry and Philosophy.” In 
Sophistes: Plato’s Dialogue and Heidegger’s Lectures in Marburg (1924-
25), edited by Diego De Brasi and Marko J. Fuchs, 27-60. Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press. 
MILLER, Mitchel. 1986. Plato’s Parmenides – the Conversion of the Soul. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
MCCABE, Mary Margaret. 1994. Plato’s Individuals. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
NEHAMAS, Alexander. 1999. Virtues of Authenticity – Essays on Plato and 
Socrates. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
OBERHAMMER, Arnold Alois. 2016. Buchstaben als 'paradeigma' in Platons 
Spätdialogen: Dialektik und Modell im ‘Theaitetos’, ‘Sophistes’, ‘Politikos’ 
und ‘Philebos’. Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 353. Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter.  
OWEN, G. E. L. 1953. “The Place of the Timaeus in Plato’s Dialogues.” The 
Classical Quarterly, 3 (1/2): 79-95 [reprinted in Allen 1965, 313-338].  
PALMER, John. 1999. Plato’s Reception of Parmenides. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
POLITIS, Vasilis. 2015. The Structure of Enquiry in Plato’s Early Dialogues. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
ROBINSON, Richard. 1941a. Plato’s Earlier Dialectic. New York: Cornell 
University Press.  
Jens Kristian LARSEN 
 
24 
ROBINSON, Richard. 1941b. “Review of Julius Stenzel’s Plato’s Method of 
Dialectic.” The Philosophical Review, 50: 542-544. 
ROWE, Christopher James. 1995. Plato – Statesman. Oxford: Aris & Phillips 
Classical Texts. 
ROSEN, Stanley. 1983. Plato’s Sophist – The Drama of Original & Image. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.  
ROSEN, Stanley. 1995. Plato’s Statesman: The Web of Politics. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  
ROSS, Davis. 1951. Plato’s Theory of Ideas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
RYLE, Gilbert. 1939. “Plato’s Parmenides.” Mind 48 (191): 129-51 and 302-325 
[reprinted in Allen 1965, 97-147].  
SCOLNICOV, Samuel, trans. 2003. Plato’s Parmenides. Translated and with an 
Introduction and Commentary. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
STENZEL, Julius. 1917. Studien zur Entwicklung der Platonischen Dialektik von 
Sokrates zu Aristoteles – Arete und Diairesis. Breslau: Trewendt & 
Granier. 
SWEENEY, Leo. 1975. “Henry Jackson's Interpretation of Plato.” Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 13 (2): 189-204. 
TAYLOR, Alfred Edward, trans. 1961. The Sophist and Statesman. London: 
Thomas Nelson & Sons. 
THESLEFF, Holger. 2014. Platonic Patterns: A Collection of Essays. Las Vegas: 
Parmenides Publishing. 
ZEKL, Hans Günther, trans. 1972. Platon – Parmenides, Translation with 
Introduction and Notes. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. 
ZUCKERT, Catherine. 2009. Plato’s Philosophers. Chicago: Chicago University 
Press. 
 
 
 
